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Abstract 
 
Ensuring safe operability and minimizing risk is the key component to 
prevent negative impact in all industries dealing with toxic, reactive, flammable 
and explosive materials.  HAZOP (Hazard and Operability), a preliminary 
and systematic approach for identifying hazards has been unquestionably 
successful in reducing incident of hazards by mitigating the consequence of 
major accident in the industrial process facilities. However, laborious work, time 
and cost are the shortcoming in performing and maintaining HAZOP analysis. 
Many research works on HAZOP automation are available, yet the traditional 
approach is still widely used by plant operators. The traditional method only 
covers parts and aspects of a specific plant type rather than generalizing to fit 
many plant types.  In HAZOP analysis of chemical process industries (CPI), 
process analysis can be divided into two groups - defined or routine process, 
which roughly occupies 60-80% and predefined or non routine process, which 
occupies 20-60% of HAZOP analysis. Thus leading towards the significance of 
having safety information as update and accessible as possible.   
 In recent years, computer hardware capable of developing and running 
virtual reality model has become more affordable for middle and small scale CPI. 
Consequently, virtual reality has been proposed as a technological breakthrough 
that holds the power to facilitate analysis. The ability to visualize complex and 
dynamic systems involving personnel, equipment and layouts during any real 
operation is a potential advantage of such an approach. With virtual reality 
supporting HAZOP, analysis which often solely relied on expert imaginative 
thinking in simulating hazard conditions, will aid understanding, memory 
retention and create a more interactive analysis experience. 
 In focusing assessment for safety operator and safety decision maker, we 
present a web-based HAZOP analysis management system (HMS) to help 
HAZOP team and related individuals to perform revision, tracking and even 
complete HAZOP analysis without management bureaucracy. Besides, 
depending solely on expert imaginative thinking of scenario using P&ID, this 
work will develop a dynamic visual model which brings to the user a different 
view of consequent and subsequent to an accident and will further enable three 
dimensional analyses of effects. This approach will prevent ‘miss looks’ due to 
‘paper-based’ view.  
 We also present Virtual HAZOP Training system, a risk-managing 
virtual training concept supported by intelligent HAZOP proposed to eliminate 
analysis redundancies and bring static ‘paper-based’ analysis to more dynamic 
and interactive virtual analysis simulation. However, the efficiency of VR 
simulator depends on the scenario accuracy to the real world that can be 
simulated. We introduce the system’s artificial intelligent engine responsible for 
retrieving the most accurate and highest possibility ‘to-happen’ scenario case. A 
fuzzy – CBR method enables the engine to classify and use real past scenarios 
combined with suitable parameters in creating a defined scenario. This method 
resolves issues in balancing between computational complexity and knowledge 
elicitation 
Reactor section in a vacuum gas oil hydrodesulphurization (VGO HDS) 
process is used as the case study to illustrate the performance of the proposed 
system. The wide usages of HDS unit in the petroleum refining industry play 
important roles in chemical plant incidents happening worldwide. HAZOP 
analysis management system in average manages to reduce more than half the 
time required in performing HAZOP analysis compares to traditional method. 
With the proposed system, operator is able to optimally use safety information in 
HMS to prevent common and repetitive mistakes. Virtual process and accident 
simulator available in virtual HAZOP training system help to improve safety 
operator estimate overall impact towards equipment, operator and environment 
during process 20-35% better. 
This system is expected to be the main foundation for Virtual Reality 
simulator research in analyzing accident caused by human factor. Asides 
providing better and healthier working environment, negative profitability 
impact which influence not only the company that runs it but also the world 
economy due to byproduct shortage, can be avoided. 
  
Abbreviations 
 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
AHA   Automatic Hazard Analyzer 
ANSI   American National Standards Institute 
CCPS   Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CIA   Chemical Industries Association 
CHAZOP  Control or (Computer) Hazard and Operability analysis 
COMHAZOP  Computer program as an aid for HAZOP studies 
ETA   Event Tree Analysis 
FMEA   Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
FRR   Facility Risk Review 
FTA   Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZAN  hazard analysis 
HAZOP  hazard and operability study 
HAZROP  Hazard, Reliability, and Operability Analysis 
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HRA   Human Reliability Analysis 
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ICI   Imperial Chemical Industries 
IPL  Independent Protection Layers 
ISA   International Standards Association 
MHA   Major Hazard Analysis 
OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PHA   Process Hazard Analysis 
P&IDs   Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams 
CBR  Case-Based Reasoning 
DBMS   Database Management Systems 
HMS  HAZOP Analysis Management System 
VR  Virtual Reality 
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 Glossary 
 
Accident: An unplanned event or sequence of events that results in undesirable 
consequence. An incident with specific safety consequence or impacts. 
Availability: The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function 
under conditions at a given time interval, assuming that the required external 
resources are provided. 
Bureaucracy: the combined organizational structure, procedures, protocols, and set 
of regulations in place to manage activity, usually in large organizations. 
Consequence: The direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually 
involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. 
Consequence Analysis: The analysis of the effects of incident outcome cases 
independent of frequency or probability. 
Event: An occurrence related to equipment performance or human action, or an 
occurrence external to the system that causes system upset. 
Event Sequence: A specific, unplanned series of events composed of an initiating 
event and intermediate events that may lead to an incident. 
Failure Mode: A symptom, condition, or fashion in which hardware fails. A failure 
mode might be identified as loss of function, premature function, or a simple 
physical characteristic. 
Fault: The state of an item characterized by inability to perform a required function, 
excluding the inability during preventive maintenance or other planned action. 
FMECA: A variation of FMEA that includes a quantitative estimate of the 
significance of the consequence of a failure mode. 
Function: The normal or characteristic actions of an item. 
Initiating Event: The first event in an event sequence and can result in an accident 
unless engineered protection systems or human actions intervene to prevent or 
mitigate the accident. 
Item: Any part, component, device, subsystem, functional unit, equipment or 
system that can be individually considered. 
Operating Time: The time interval during which an item is in an operating state. 
Reliability: The probability of an item to perform a required function, under given 
conditions, for a given time interval. 
Risk: The combination of the expected frequency and consequence of a single 
accident or a group of accidents. 
Risk Assessment: The process by which the results of a risk analysis are used to 
make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or 
through comparison with risk targets. 
Risk Management: The systematic application of management policies, procedures, 
and practices to the tasks of analysis, assessing, and controlling risk in order to 
protect employees, the general public, the environment, and company assets. 
Risk Measures: Ways of combining and expressing information on likelihood with 
the magnitude of loss or injury. 
Safety System: Equipment and/or procedures designed to limit or terminate an 
accident sequence, thus mitigating the accident and its consequences. 
Safety Operator : person who is in charge of ensuring safety before, during and after 
operation. 
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General Introduction 
1.1 General Overview of Research Problem 
 
To compete in the ever – expanding global market as well as to meet 
increasingly tighter safety and environmental constraints, process industries are 
being compelled to ensure safer, operable and reliable  plants and process that 
result in safer high-quality product in shorter time and lesser cost. Therefore, 
different approaches are needed that address all these requirements throughout the 
plant process from the eyes of safety personnel. 
Safety personnel are individuals whose responsibility is to ensure safety 
before, during and after operations. Depending on country or companies, a different 
term is used to describe individual whose tasks involve safety management. Safety 
officer, safety operator, safety engineer and health and safety executive (HSE) are 
among the common designations for the personnel in charge of safety management. 
In this thesis, we will use the term safety operator. Unlike field operator, whose 
work task is running the operation, safety operator has to know all aspects of the 
operations to make safety decisions, layout safety procedures and other related 
tasks. In general, safety operator can be categories into two, depending on their 
overall task. By referring Figure 1.1, the first category is a safety operator whose 
main task is a field operator; while the second category is a safety operator who 
belongs to a safety department with task specifically on safety management. In 
general case of the first category, the most experienced and the most senior 
operators are given the responsibility to outline procedures for emergency. The 
advantage is that operators become expert on every aspect of the operation under 
his/her supervision. However, the expert operator is faced with over task which 
results in working tension. Technical know-how and the acquired experience will 
also be jeopardized incase the operator decide to leave the company. Japanese 
companies are a common example of companies using the first category of safety 
operator. In other countries like Europe, oil and gas companies have their own 
safety department which responsible for overall safety of the company. These safety 
operators are required to have the deep knowledge of every aspect of the company 
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operations and as a result, they receive off site training such as offered by 
Occupational Health & Safety Advisory Services (OHSA) institute. The advantage 
of such training is that documentation - procedures manual are well organized. 
Invariably, this prevents knowledge and skill acquisition as every safety procedural 
step has been detailed thereby undermining the capability of the operator in 
responding to emergency risk operations. Consequently, acquiring operation skills 
in risk management is far from the field operator. 
 
 
Fig 1.1 Safety personnel classifications. 
 
Risk as defined by OHSAS is the product of the probability of a hazard 
resulting in an adverse event and the severity of the event. Most human activities 
involve specific risks. The risk profiles of industries change with time as certain 
hazards are overcome, new ones appear. The main hazards of the process industries 
arise from the escape of process materials, which may be inherently dangerous or 
become dangerous being present at high pressures and high or low temperatures. A 
review of worldwide chemical or chemical related incidents that have had major 
impacts on surrounding communities is summarized in table 1.1. This suggests the 
need for improved approaches to the handling of hazardous materials [1].  
As chemical industries become increasingly complicated and automated, 
the gap between safety operators and processes becomes wider. Safety operators 
lose the ability to analysis real processes as field operator manipulate plants 
through control panels, which include switches, alarms, recorders, monitors, and 
many other instruments. It is difficult for them to understand all the knowledge 
about relevant processes and  emergency situations. Accidents in chemical 
processes arise mostly from operator error [2]. 
To reduce these errors in operating procedures, effective analysis methods 
must be developed. In the past the objective of safety operator analysis was only to 
prevent direct damage and to reduce the loss of lives and property from accidents 
but at present, it includes the wider meaning of developing human resources and 
Safety 
personnel
Field /safety 
operator 
Safety 
Department
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increasing the productivity, safety and efficiency of industries. The importance of 
safety operator education is emphasized now more than ever. 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) has always been considered an important 
factor in staying competitive in a global economy. Safety operator need to remain up 
to date with the latest methods and technology. Most people would agree that safety 
training is important, but there is an obvious cost in developing or purchasing 
safety training. Companies also lose productive operator time while they sit through 
the training; not to mention travel costs if the training is not offered locally [3]. 
Safety Training should involve an introduction to basic hazards and plant 
procedures in which the flammability, toxicity and the corrosive properties of 
chemicals are discussed. Also the use of personal protective equipment, fire alarm 
systems and work safety processes should be incorporated. The safety operator 
should be assigned to a particular plant to work alongside an experienced operator, 
in order to receive practical instructions in all aspects of plant operations, including 
safety and emergency processes. These safety training methods in combination with 
available process hazard analysis can be used to help the safety operator to 
understand specialized aspects of process hazards such as emergency safety and 
permit-to-work systems. 
Three-dimensional simulation systems allow users to navigate in any 
direction within a computer-generated environment, decide what actions to take 
and immediately see the impact of those actions [4]. These virtual reality systems 
allow safety operator to walk around the plant, see all the equipment that 
constitutes the process, have the possibility of starting, running and shutting down 
equipment and responding to error conditions without causing any damage to the 
equipment or harm to themselves. 
 
Table 1.1: Selected major incidents 
Incident Impact 
Flixborough in United Kingdom 
(1974) 
Vapour cloud explosion 
28 fatalities on-site; $232 million 
damage; 
damage to homes off site 
Seveso in Italy (1976) 
Toxic material release 
Widespread contamination 
on-site and off-site 
  
Bhopal in India (1984) 
Toxic material release 
300 fatalities, $20 million 
damage, mostly offsite 
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Mexico City LPG (1984) 
LPG Explosion 
2500 fatalities many others 
injured off-site 
 
Chernobyl in Ukraine (1986) 
Fire and radiation release 
31 fatalities; 300 square miles 
evacuated; 
widespread contamination 
Sandoz warehouse Switzerland 
(1986) 
Toxic material release 
Major impact on ecology of 
Rhine River 
Shell Norco refinery in United 
States (1988) 
Vapour cloud explosion 
7 fatalities on-site; neighbouring town 
evacuated; damage exceeded $50 
million; 
widespread damage to homes 
off-site 
 
The human and economic costs of accidents worldwide can be shocking. In 
2004 industrial workplace accidents killed one person every two hours and injured 
one person every five seconds. The cost of accidents at work and occupational 
diseases ranged for most countries from 2.6 to 3.8% of Gross National Product [5]. 
Up to 85% of accidents can be traced back to human & organizational factors 
causes:  
? Unclear management structure, unavailability of information, 
? Lack of coordination, 
? Ineffective training, 
? Procedure difficult to use,  
? Inadequate investigation for the causes of most recurring problems,  
? Deviations from safety procedures are among the main causes. 
 
Unfortunately, safety operators are the one who will be blamed for this. Safety 
operators’ occupation description is direct or indirectly related to the above causes. 
 
It is believed that virtual reality can be successfully applied to improve analysis and 
hazard awareness issues in the field of chemical engineering. Chemical Blue Chip 
Companies have utilized virtual reality technology for a long time for field operators 
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training module. Virtual reality can offer the potential to immerse personnel into an 
interactive and well controlled virtual world containing simulated hazards. This 
may operate as an enhancement to existing process hazard analysis (PHA) method 
especially HAZOP. While HAZOP undeniably has successfully managed to mitigate 
major accident, HAZOP analysis done by human teams has the following 
shortcomings: time consuming, laborious, expensive and inconsistent.  To solve 
these problems, various model and/or rule-based HAZOP expert systems have been 
developed during the last one decade [6]. These systems, however, can only address 
“routine” or process-generic HAZOP analysis. In the chemical process industries 
(CPI), “routine” HAZOP analysis roughly occupies 60-80% while “non-routine” or 
process-specific HAZOP analysis occupies 20-40%. Due to the lack of learning 
capability of the current HAZOP experts systems, the knowledge of non-routine 
analysis could not be formulated and reused for similar chemical processes, and the 
“non-routine” HAZOP analysis still needs to be addressed by human experts. The 
major problem with HAZOP expert system proposed in [1] is design to fit general 
plant instead of plant type specific. This leaves incompleteness of HAZOP analysis.  
 A normal practice of CPI is to record all near miss cases or accident cases 
for future reference. These cases sometime can be traced back from five to even ten 
years ago. In this dissertation, we propose a system that can manipulate and take 
advantages of this information in completing HAZOP analysis. Because of these 
cases are past histories they are more reliable compare to expert knowledge. We 
used risk factor as an indexing mechanism for setting cases priority in order to 
assist safety operator in deciding responses upon emergency. 
 From an interview with safety operators, we found several issues arise from 
the operator view point that never been discussed in past research in the safety 
domain. These issues are: Inadequate safety training, management bureaucracy, 
Miss looks and access limit. 
 Inadequate safety training, in the recent world economy parlance, does not 
imply that experienced employee had to be laid off or willingly quit for better salary 
pays. It has been a big problem for any industries that rely on the experience 
workers when to lose this valuable human asset. New hired field operator will learn 
from senior and more experience operators while in some chemical plant, virtual 
training or off-site training also available for them to accelerate the learning 
process. However, for safety operator, this kind of training is not widely available 
for them. Often, safety personnel solely rely on an old guide book for learning. 
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 With regards to problem of management bureaucracy, in standard plant, 
process hazard analysis normally kept by the safety department or human resource 
department depending on production scale. Due to safety analysis documentation 
nature, the possibility that this documentation be revised or referred often is low. 
The troublesome procedure faced by the operator in terms of form filling, permission 
request for using or modifying leading obsolete analysis constitutes a bottleneck. 
The possibility of the revision of the documentation is only during a safety audit 
which is dependent on the plant management itself which is every quarter year to 
one year. 
 Prior to HAZOP analysis, preparation including brainstorming, site visit 
and information gathering are conduct. During the analysis itself, HAZOP team 
will use P and ID and their expert creative imagination to simulate the possible 
sequence and consequent. This action often results in overlooking mistakes where 
the location of real physical equipment is influencing the environment. The 
phenomenon is referred to as Miss looks in industrial operations. An example is, 
heat from heat exchanger may leak to a nearby container belonging to a totally 
different process line or overlapping pipes and equipments. This can only be noticed 
by being on the site while doing the analysis. 
 Consequently, the primary issues addressed by this research are to propose 
mechanisms and develop implementation of system to assist safety operator in 
managing safety information as well as use the information effectively during 
critical time. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The overall aim of this work is to investigate and develop risk management system 
using virtual support and artificial intelligence techniques to improve safety 
analysis. We are focusing to assist safety operator to manage safety information, 
especially on how to reuse past near miss and accident cases to increase safety 
awareness. Deciding a risk level for scenario was never an easy task for safety 
operator. Qualitative factor that contribute to risk factor are converted to 
quantitative value therefore helping safety operator to make the right decision to 
react judging by the risk value. We facilitate decision making by proposing visual 
support in a form of 3D model and virtual reality simulation that can be molded in 
such a way that can penetrate safety operator mind. This has involved the 
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development of emergency scenarios for application in the chemical process 
industry during hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP). It is believed that the 
use of such systems will increase safety awareness and knowledge of safety 
procedures and therefore hopefully lead to reducing the plant accident rate. 
 
The specific objectives can be classified in the following way: 
 
? To facilitate risk estimation for safety recommendation. 
? To integrate intelligent system into HAZOP to give learning 
capability to traditional HAZOP. 
? To improve the HAZOP analysis quality continuously during 
practice. 
? To take the advantages of other safety information such as near 
miss and accident cases to assist safety analysis. 
? To investigate the general suitability and potential of virtual reality 
technology for safety audit application in the field of chemical 
engineering 
? To develop a range of virtual chemical plants environments in 
which to train safety operators for a range of different scenarios 
? To identify components and characteristics of the HAZOP processes 
to be simulated in the virtual world for adequate realism and 
training acceptance 
? To develop a complete but easy to use system of HAZOP analysis for 
a range of chemical plant scenarios. 
1.3  Research Methodologies 
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) which undoubtedly is the most widely 
used process hazard analysis is chosen to provide safety analysis information. 
Process Safety Management, within which the HAZOP discipline is a key 
component, has been unquestionably successful in reducing the incidence and 
mitigating the consequences of major accidents in all industries dealing with toxic, 
reactive, flammable and explosive substances. There has not been quite another 
Flixborough much less a Bhopal type incident since the widespread advent of these 
procedures. This means protecting the communities adjacent to such facilities as 
well as the workers within them. Incompleteness and inconsistence of HAZOP 
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analysis is covered by using proposed Fuzzy-CBR method - a hybrid of fuzzy logic 
and case base reasoning technique used in this research for indexing and retrieving 
similar cases for a future analysis. In safety domain, risk factor is very important in 
making decision. As we are in the safety domain and not soft-computing domain, 
the proposed approach enables us to apply fuzzy and case base reasoning for 
separate knowledge representation. A proportional risk assessment is suggested to 
be indexer for the case base, where case with higher risk value is priorities for 
action. While HAZOP analysis information, near miss, accident case and past 
scenario are knowledge case base representation. Virtual reality is responsible for 
bringing safe analysis experience to safety operator without endanger or giving 
negative impact on overall plant operability. The integration of these three methods 
as shown in Figure 1.2 are applied into the proposed HAZOP analysis management 
system, and virtual HAZOP analysis system produces an intelligence risk 
management tools for safety personnel. HAZOP analysis management system is 
used to manage and manipulate safety information while virtual HAZOP analysis 
assists safety operator to perform HAZOP analysis with virtual reality support. 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 Intelligent Risk Management System  
Figure 1.3 shows the relationship between proposed methodologies. Information 
 
 
Virtual 
Reality
HAZOP
Fuzzy-CBR
Intelligence 
Risk 
Management
system
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from HAZOP and previous safety cases such as near miss cases are managed and 
manipulated by fuzzy-CBR. Similar case within case base is compared to HAZOP 
case. If suitable, the case from case base will be used to improve HAZOP case 
description. Fuzzy-CBR is dynamic while the rules of decision making is not static 
and thus can be adjusted according to operator need. For example, to retrieve and 
reuse case from case base, similarity index must be between 0.8 and 1.0, which 
mean almost the same. However, case base with a small number of cases can be 
benefited by widening the similarity index from 0.5 to 1.0, which will include more 
results. Accurate and high precession is achieved by indexing and matching only the 
most similar cases. This retrieved cases are associated with keyword, which used by 
virtual reality scenario as parameters. This scenario will be used to help safety 
operator visualizes HAZOP scenario.  
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Relationship between methodologies 
 
1.4 Research Significance 
his research work contributes to the HAZOP analysis in chemical process 
industry
 
T
 using intelligence system. As mentioned before, the quality of HAZOP 
analysis depends on the knowledge and experience of the HAZOP team. Therefore, 
incompleteness and inconsistence usually are the drawbacks with regards to 
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HAZOP done by human teams. Given the enormous amounts of time, efforts and 
money involved in performing HAZOP, there exists considerable incentive to 
develop intelligent systems for assisting the process hazards analysis of chemical 
process plants. An intelligent system can reduce the time, efforts and expense 
involved.   
Learning to predict and prevent chemical process hazards is an essential 
part of 
he unique contributions of this research work are as summarized 
below. 
? This work combines virtual reality simulation with 
? uzzy-CBR method - a hybrid of fuzzy logic and case 
the safety operator education. However, taking advantages of available 
safety information was not a simple task. While others similar research focusing 
on safety training for field operator, this research is focusing on assisting 
new-to-experience safety personnel to be able to handle emergency situations 
effectively and at the same time able to profitably minimize the negative 
impact on life in case of unavoidable accident incidence. The light weight and 
portability of developed system expected to mould safety operator mind set to 
a new level. Compare to field operator, safety operator unable to fully master 
every aspect of the plant. Without real situation emergency training of every 
part of the plant, it is difficult for safety operator to make important decision 
regarding safety and develop safety procedures based only on previous PHA. 
Developed risk management system in this research is hoped to assist safety 
operators to be able to see beyond their imagination. 
 
T
HAZOP for providing virtual model support in 
assisting HAZOP analysis. The integrated system 
now helps HAZOP team to see different perspectives 
that were impossible with the pipe and instrument 
diagrams (PID). Hitherto, there has not been a 
similar work combining virtual reality simulation 
with HAZOP analysis in this manner.  
 
F
base reasoning technique is used in this research for 
indexing and retrieving similar cases for a future 
analysis. This helps in overcoming the 
incompleteness and inconsistence of conventional 
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HAZOP analysis method. In this new integrated 
system, safety information is stored in single case 
base where accident data from past long years can 
be easily reused. The proposed information 
management system serves as a supplement for 
continuously improving quality of HAZOP analysis 
during practice.  
 
? The virtual analysis environment proposed in this 
 
 is worth noting that consistence and completeness are critical in HAZOP 
analysis
1.5 Justification for the research studies 
Risk management undeniably is a crucial part in any industrial 
system
thesis interfaces with various safety information 
modules. This newly designed user interface system 
provides support for retrieval of information on pipe 
and instrument diagram from database. The new 
system is different from common virtual reality 
simulation where users interact with and immerse 
into the system during practice.  
It
 because neglect of any potential hazard may even result in disasters. 
Investigation results of past industrial accidents, e.g. the tragic BP Texas city plant 
accident occurred in March 2005, have proven that poor quality of PHA is a major 
root cause of accidents occurred in the CPI. 
 
 
/plant involving hazard materials and processes. HAZOP, the well 
established risk assessment and process hazard analysis method, require different 
aspects of improvement to increase safety information completeness and usability. 
There is a need for effective utilization and management of HAZOP information as 
these safety information are required as long as the plant operate.  In safety 
domain, risk is used as the key in prioritizing action in ensuring process safety. 
However, deciding a risk level for a process/scenario is a time consuming task. A 
team of safety analysts would agree a process is a high risk process, but how high 
the risk is still debatable. Is it a high risk, a very high risk or an unacceptable kind 
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of risk is difficult to be agreed by everyone in the team? This risk level will 
determine what action ought to be taken. Deciding the risk level would consume 
time even for a single process. Hitherto, there is no method to model risk that suits 
every safety operator decision. Risk matrix only addresses the direct byproduct of 
risk component which will not address safety operator rules. Therefore, a concept of 
fuzziness is required to govern the rules in risk estimation. Hitherto, virtual aid 
such as virtual reality or virtual model has never been used to facilitate HAZOP 
analysis. Virtual aid is established to be a profound medium in current process 
safety training for operators. Low cost per performance of this technology enables 
everyone to enjoy the virtual aid benefit. When these two concepts are combined, it 
is expected to increase HAZOP expert system efficiency. Fuzzy-cbr proposed in this 
thesis with virtual aid; provide tools to assist HAZOP study with reliable reasoning 
for analysis result. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
hapter one is the general introduction which consists of the research 
problem
 
C
 overview which highlights the weakness in present chemical safety 
analysis and consequently leads to setting research objectives about improving 
overall HAZOP analysis experience. The impact of final product towards enhancing 
plant safety is suggested in this Chapter. Chapter two discusses available literature 
relating to hazards and safety in the chemical industries. Chapter three deals with 
the theoretical framework in which Hazard and operability (HAZOP) methodology 
is employed as a foundation for Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) technique. 
Modifications of the conventional HAZOP towards more versatile and intelligent 
PHA used in this research are explained. Following is the artificial intelligence 
hybrid methods of fuzzy logic and case base reasoning, method of analogical 
reasoning which is common and extremely important in human cognition is 
introduced. Here we explain how fuzzy-CBR is applied in the proposed system. 
Chapter four is on the development of intelligence risk management system – an 
intelligent HAZOP Analysis Management System which treats in detail the 
development and work flow of HAZOP Analysis. Introducing the service of web 
based interface enable portability and easiness when performing HAZOP analysis, 
whether for record tracking, updating/ revising or even new analysis record. 
Following is Virtual HAZOP training system which presents three dimensional 
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models to be used for safety training. Enhancing this safety training is an 
integrated HAZOP database which helps in retrieving most possible and real 
scenario. This is achieved by using operator selection and comparing it to previous 
scenario. Parameters of previous scenario are extracted and reused by the system to 
retrieved new scenario. Chapter five considers the application to industrial safety 
management and presents a case study of Vacuum Liquid Gas 
Hydrodesulphurization model with highlights of some of the issues and problems 
relating to operation especially issues relating to plant operator training and safety. 
The final part of this dissertation is the Conclusions and Future Research Work. It 
draws the conclusions arising from this work and states some recommendations for 
the use of HAZOP, fuzzy-CBR and virtual reality in chemical engineering industries 
and in chemical engineering education. The possible future research works and 
work in progress is reviewed. 
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Preliminaries and Basic 
Concepts in Risk Management 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses available literature relating to hazards and safety in 
the chemical industries. It also provides a short description of a number of incidents 
in order to show the consequences of such events. Furthermore, it considers some of 
the main hazards in the chemical industries and discusses the process safety issues 
while indicating methods to avoid and anticipate catastrophic events for chemical 
plants. The definitions of risk and safety management stated in this chapter outline 
the differences. In chemical process industries, safety management systems (SMS) 
are more preferred in terms of overall purpose. Risk management system proposed 
in this thesis has never been discussed in any literature of safety concern. However, 
similar systems employing risk assessments to ensure safety are available with 
different process hazard analysis (PHA).  
2.2  Safety in Chemical Industry 
2.2.1 Safety Culture 
 
The increasing size and complexity of industrial processes creates increased 
scope for major disasters, leading to greatly increased public concern about 
industrial safety. The last century has seen series of such disasters worldwide. 
There is a widespread concern over the hazards of chemicals, not only to 
those who work with them but also to the environment and the general public. 
Unless a chemical plant is well designed, it is very difficult to prevent dangerous 
materials from releasing. Safety in chemical industries cannot be treated as a 
separate subject such as design, production or maintenance, but depends 
inextricably on both the technical competences and safety awareness of all staff and 
employees [7] 
Nan Bin Mad Sahar© Chapter 2: Preliminaries and Basic 
Concepts in Risk Management 
 
15 
 
 
Process safety has advanced over the last thirty years. In the 1970s the 
introduction of a number of checklists, such as the development of HAZOP studies 
and the Dow’s Fire and Explosions Index constituted a major breakthrough in the 
history of industrial safety. Dow’s Fire and Explosions Index is a checklist method 
of hazard identification, which provides a comparative ranking of the degree of 
hazard posed by particular design conditions and its third edition is published as a 
manual by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers [8] In the 1980s came an 
increase in the regulation of chemical plants which culminated in an overall socio 
technical and audit approach covering all aspects of design, operation and 
management of chemical plants [9]. 
The extent to which health and safety thinking is reflected in business 
activities and decision-making is an important determinant of effectiveness. The 
practical implications of safety policies must be thought through so as to avoid 
conflict between the demands of policy and other operational requirements. 
Management decisions were insufficient attention or weight given to health and 
safety leading to [9] 
? Unrealistic time scales for the implementation of plans which put 
pressure on people to reduce supervision; 
? Work scheduling and rosters which fail to take account of problems 
of fatigue; 
? Inadequate resources being allocated to training; 
? Organizational restructuring which places people in positions for 
which they have insufficient experience;  
? Jobs and controls systems which fail to recognize or allow for the 
fact that people are likely to make mistakes and might have 
difficulties communicating with one another. 
 
Beyond the technical issues, the influence of human error in the chain of 
events leading to accident and failures in the organization as well as management 
of safety issues, emerge strongly from inquiries. The most detailed set of safety 
rules and procedures are meaningless unless they are implemented and kept under 
regulatory review. It is essential that the immediate causes of accidents are seen in 
the wider context of the organization and management climate in which they occur 
and it is important to focus on the design of systems and equipment in order to 
minimize the potential for human error. 
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The twelfth edition of Marsh and McLennan’s annual review analyzes the 
largest chemical industry losses, which refer to the cost of injuries and damage, 
since 1959 [11].Most of these losses occurred in oil refineries while the highest 
average losses occurred in natural gas processing plants. Mechanical failure of 
equipment was the most frequent of these causes. Most of these could have been 
avoided by proper inspection and maintenance. The next most frequent cause was 
stated to be operational errors, which could have been avoided by providing more 
effective training of operators. 
Piping systems, which include hose, tubing, flanges, gauges, strainers and 
expansion joints were the most frequent origin of loss. The low frequency of losses 
originating at pumps and compressors was unexpected [8] 
The public no longer regards processes industries as something remote 
from them, run by operators with an incomprehensive language of their own, but 
they consider them capable of giving rise to events which may directly affect 
ordinary people. Public opinion in the majority of countries is concerned about 
industrial accidents and their effects and will not tolerate fatalities on the scale that 
once existed. 
 
2.2.2 Hazard in Chemical Industries 
 
A hazard is a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage 
to property, damage to the environment or some combination of these. Hazards do 
not only involve process plant and associated materials but also major structures, 
and materials, which release ionizing radiation [7]. The hazards, which are 
commonly identified in chemical industries, can be grouped in several different 
categories. These categories include electrical hazards, health and occupational 
hygiene hazards, chemical reactions hazards, explosion and fire hazards, 
operational and control hazards and hardware hazards. 
 
2.2.2.1 Electrical hazards 
Electricity is a safe and efficient form of energy and is a convenient source 
for lighting, heating and power. The proper use of electricity is not dangerous but if 
out of control, can cause harm to human in form of electric shock. In the United 
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Kingdom every year up to fifty people may be killed and up to a thousand are 
injured at work as a result of electrical accident [11]. 
 
2.2.2.2 Health and occupational hygiene hazards 
Health and occupational hygiene is the science of anticipating, recognizing 
and controlling workplace conditions that may cause workers’ injury or illness. 
Major workplace risks can include chemical, biological, physical and ergonomic 
hazards. Harmful chemical compounds in the form of solids, liquids and gases exert 
toxic effects by inhalation, absorption or injection. Airborne chemical hazards exist 
as concentrations of mists, vapors, gases, fumes or solids. The degree of worker risk 
to any given substance depends on the nature and potency of the toxic effects and 
the magnitude and duration of exposure. Information on the risk to personnel from 
chemical hazards can be obtained from a material safety data sheet, which is a 
summary of the important health, safety and toxicological information on the 
chemical or mixture’s ingredients [12]. 
Biological hazards include bacteria, viruses and other living organism that 
can cause acute and chronic inflection by entering the human body. Occupations 
that deal with plants or animals or their products or with food processing products 
may expose workers to biological hazards. It is essential for an industry to provide 
proper ventilation, appropriate personal protective equipment such as gloves and 
respirators and adequate infectious waste disposal systems [12]. 
Physical hazards include excessive levels of electromagnetic radiation, 
noise, illumination and temperature. In occupations where there is exposure to 
radiation time distance and shielding are important tools in ensuring worker safety. 
Danger from radiation increases with the amount of time one is exposed to it. Hence, 
the shorter the time of exposure, the smaller the radiation danger will be. Distance, 
also is an available tool in controlling exposure to radiation and the radiation levels 
from some sources. It can be estimated by comparing the squares of distance 
between the worker and the source. Shielding involves the placing of protective 
materials between the source and the person to absorb partially or completely the 
amount of radiation [13]. 
Noise, another significant physical hazard can be controlled by installing 
equipment and systems that have been engineered, design and built to operate 
quietly or by enclosing or shielding noisy parts and by providing hearing protective 
equipment to personnel. 
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The part that lighting plays in ensuring a safe and healthy place of work is 
increasingly recognized. The standard of luminance required depends on the visual 
efficiency necessary for the tasks involved and the decisions should be based on the 
recommendations of the code for lighting produced by Illuminating Engineering 
Society [12]. 
 
2.2.2.3 Chemical reaction hazards 
A chemical reaction that goes out of control and runaways can create a 
serious incident with the risk of injury to people and damage to property and the 
environment. The reactivity of chemicals in process industries is a potential process 
hazard. The chemical reactivity of any substance should be considered in the 
following contexts [8]. 
? Its reactivity with atmospheric oxygen 
? Its reactivity with elements and compounds with which it is required to 
react in the process 
? Its reactivity with water 
? Its reactivity with itself 
? Its reactivity with other materials with which it may come in contact 
unintentionally in process  
? Its reactivity with materials of construction 
 
Most hazards are caused by reactivity with atmospheric oxygen and the 
majority of problems arise from oxidative self-heating. In most continuous organic 
chemical reactors, which operate under pressure, air is automatically excluded. In 
some cases more stringent measures are taken not merely to prevent air entering 
the plant while it is running but also to remove it before the plant starts up and to 
remove oxygen from materials entering the process. 
The reactivity between reactants in processes must be carefully studied and 
considered when a reaction system is designed, both from thermodynamic and 
kinetic aspects. From the safety point of view, it is extremely important whether a 
reaction is strongly exothermic, moderately exothermic, mildly exothermic, 
thermally neutral or endothermic. Exothermic reactions are usually difficult to 
control in continuous process involving gases and liquids and are most difficult to 
control in batch processes where the entire charge of reactants is added at the start 
of the batch, where both liquids and solids are present. An exothermic reaction can 
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lead to thermal runaway, which begins when the heat produced by the reaction 
exceeds the heat removed. The rates of most reactions increase rapidly with 
temperature leading to the danger of their getting out of control, with large rises in 
temperature and pressure and loss of containment of the process material. 
 
2.2.2.4 Explosion and fire hazards 
The term explosion is used to describe incidents where there is a rapid 
release of energy, which causes a significant blast wave capable of causing damage. 
The gases in a chemical explosion, which is formed as a result of chemical reactions, 
expand rapidly due to a sudden increase in temperature, thereby increasing the 
pressure relative to the surrounding atmosphere. The damage which arises from an 
explosion may be caused either by the effect of a blast wave or by projected 
fragments or items of equipment. All chemical explosions are very fast; they give 
out heat, and make a loud noise. They fall into two classes: 
? Explosive deflagrations, which are caused by chemical reactions, 
which are passed through the deflagrating materials at well below 
sonic velocity. They develop an appreciable pressure producing a 
blast wave with the potential to damage and the burnt products 
move in the opposite direction from that of combustion wave. 
? Detonations are caused by very rapid chemical reactions which pass 
through the exploding materials at speeds of 1-10km/s. High 
pressures are developed and the burst products move in the same 
direction as the combustion wave. 
Explosives, which normally detonate, are termed high explosives such as 
TNT (trinitrotoluene) and have high shattering power even when unconfined. 
Fire is a process of combustion characterized by heat or smoke or flame or 
any combination of these.  
 
2.2.2.5 Operational and control hazards 
There have been a number of recent and well-publicized accidents in which 
human error has played a prominent part. For example, in Texas City in 1969 the 
operators opened an escape valve in the overhead product line of a butadiene plant 
which was placed on total reflux whilst other parts were being serviced. As a result 
an unstable compound, vinyl acetylene, concentrated in the bottom of the column. 
Eventually two tones of vinyl acetylene in the liquid phase detonated, scattering 
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large pieces of the column up to 900 meters and the fire burned for 60 hours [14]. 
In order to understand the contribution of human behavior to the risk of 
accidents it is essential to examine the errors people make and what leads to such 
errors. The reduction of human error probability can lead to a reduction in the 
probability of accidents in chemical industries. 
A useful classification framework identifies the human errors as 
slips-lapses, mistakes or violations. Slips or lapses typically occur through lack of 
attention or from stressful situations with the result that individuals fail to achieve 
what they intend to do. Slip or lapse human errors include forgetting to turn off 
power, becoming inattentive to important safety checks or forgetting important 
steps in work procedures, which may cause equipment damage [13]. 
Mistakes can result from incorrect decisions, poor communications and 
infrequently practiced operations. Typical mistakes include failure to appreciate the 
dangers of equipment and materials used, misunderstanding of operational 
procedures and emergency situations or failure to realize the implications of a 
process plant. Individual or team training is the most effective way to reduce these 
mistakes. Virtual reality training systems can help trainees to learn from their 
mistakes without causing any damage to equipment or themselves. 
Violations are deliberate decisions to break agreed procedures. They can be 
associated with a steady drift into unacceptable attitudes, or can be deliberate acts 
by a workforce to adopt unsafe and unapproved practices. Some violation human 
errors include the deliberate use of unauthorized lifting equipment, the breaking of 
rules for an electrical unit or deviation from permitted work process. The study of 
the relationship between employees and the equipment with which they work in 
parallel with the physical environment in which man-machine system operates is 
extremely important for the safe and effective operation of process industries.  
 
2.2.2.6 Hardware hazards 
Even in the best designed machinery, plants failures can occur. If the cause 
of failure is investigated, the repetition can be normally prevented. Modes of failure 
relate to the type of stress under which the component has been working and the 
characteristic features of failures due to tension, compression, shear and torsion are 
well known. Sometimes the failure is related more to the operating process than to 
the stress. When in particular, there is repeated stress cycling of a part, it can 
subsequently leads to fatigue failure [13]. 
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2.2.3 Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification 
 
Risk is the likelihood of a specified undesired event occurring within a 
specified period or in specified circumstances. It may be either the frequency (the 
number of specified events occurring in unit time) or the probability (the probability 
of a specified event following a prior event), depending on the circumstances [8]. 
Cooper and Chapman [10] define risk as the exposure to the possibility of 
economic or financial loss or gain, physical damage or injury, or delay, as a 
consequence of the uncertainty associated with pursuing course of action. 
A further definition of risk, which is used as the basis of many risk 
assessment techniques, is similar to the one quoted by Horton [13] and says that the 
term risk is used to cover the combination of an unfavorable result and the 
possibility of its occurrence. It is used as the recognition of future uncertainty and 
implies that a given set of circumstances has more than one possible outcome. 
 
2.2.3.1 Risk Assessment 
Improvement in safety performance has often meant seeking to reduce the 
number of potential accidents. The process of risk assessment attempts to minimize 
or eradicate the probability of an accident occurring. Risk assessment has been used 
informally throughout history, whenever there is a decision to be made, or an action 
taken there is always an associated risk. The outcome of the decision is in the future 
and is therefore uncertain, different actions might mean different outcomes while 
some outcomes might be more desirable than others. 
The wide variety of industrial activities has created a wide variety of 
different definitions and hence a blur between terms such as risk assessment, risk 
analysis and risk estimation. Jones [8] gives one of the clearest definitions: 
? Risk assessment is the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired 
events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused together with 
value judgments’ made concerning the significance of the results. 
? Risk analysis is an imprecise term that infers the quantified calculation of 
probabilities and risks without taking any judgments’ about their relevance. 
As such it is equivalent to risk estimation. 
 
The assessment of risks is necessary in order to identify their relative 
importance and to obtain information about their extent and nature. This will help 
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in deciding on methods of control. Knowledge of both areas is necessary to identify 
where to place the major effort in prevention and control, and in order to make 
decisions on the adequacy of control measures [12]. Assessing risks will demand a 
thorough knowledge of all the activities and working practices. The knowledge of 
the employees and safety representatives involved often proves valuable. 
Competent people should carry out risk assessments, and professional health and 
safety advice may be necessary in some cases [12]. 
Determining the relative importance of risks involves deciding on the 
severity of the hazard and the likelihood of occurrence. There is no universal 
formula for rating risk in relative importance but a number of techniques have been 
developed to assist in decision-making. 
 
2.2.3.2 Hazard Identification 
The identification of hazards is the vital element of risk analysis and its 
effectiveness requires a deep understanding of the process, which is clearly 
dependent on the knowledge, experience, engineering judgments and imagination of 
the team to whom the task is assigned. It can also be seen as a useful discipline in 
its own right. For example, identifying hazards at an early stage will often allow 
them to be eliminated by a modification of the design or system [13]. Hazard 
identification is the process of determining what hazards are associated with a 
given operation or design, as it is operating. In existing operations, hazard 
identification is performed periodically to determinate the implications of changes 
to process knowledge and to recognize changes to process, equipment and materials. 
 
2.2.3.3 Reliability and failure analysis 
Reliability can be defined as the probability that a component will perform 
a required specified function. This may depends on the components success in 
commencing to operate when required, continuing to operate subsequently, not 
operating on demand, and not continuing after the demand has ceased. The 
reliability of a multi-component system depends on the incidence of failures in the 
components. Data on such failure may be fitted to statistical distributions for use in 
reliability analysis [8]. 
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2.2.3.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is the technique that can be used to determine failure 
sequences and probabilities in complex systems. In a FTA a logic diagram or “fault 
tree” is developed to determine the causes of an undesired event. A fault tree may 
be constructed for virtually any undesired event that can occur within the system. 
Once an undesired event has been selected, it is shown at the top of the diagram 
and all the circumstances that lead to it are determined by reasoning backward 
from this event. These circumstances are then broken down into events that can 
produce them, and so on. The process is continued until all events that can 
ultimately lead to the undesired event are identified. Special symbols are used in 
FTA to represent events and their logical relationships. Circles, rectangles, 
diamonds and house-shaped Figs are the symbols which are used for events and 
indicate certain characteristics about them. Other symbols, called “logic gates” show 
the manner in which events at one level of fault tree combine to produce an event at 
the next higher level [8]. 
 
2.2.3.5 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is based on identifying the possible 
failure modes of each component of a system and predicting the consequences of the 
failure. In this procedure each item used in the system, which might include the 
people, equipment, materials, machine parts or environment, is listed on an FMEA. 
The analyst should consider the exact modes in which each item can fail. For 
example if a control valve fails to open it could result in too much pressure or the 
wrong ratios of flow [8]. The analysis is continued by determining the effects of each 
failure combination. Both the effects on other items within the system and those on 
overall system performance are considered and evaluations are then made 
concerning the seriousness of each failure or failure combination. Finally, the 
means of detecting each failure is determined and any additional remarks 
regarding the failures are recorded [6]. 
 
2.2.3.6 Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) 
The most widely known technique is that published by H.G. Lawley and 
later by the Chemical Industries Association in the United Kingdom under the title 
“A guide to hazard and operability studies” [7]. Hazard and operability studies can 
be applied to existing process plants, in particular when modifications are being 
Nan Bin Mad Sahar© Chapter 2: Preliminaries and Basic 
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considered, but are most effective when carried out at a design stage where a wide 
range of possible actions still exist. The method uses guidewords such as “too much” 
and “too little”, which can be applied to the process parameters to generate “what if” 
questions. The guidewords that are used must be relevant to the stage of design and 
must be sufficiently comprehensive to be capable of identifying the hazards involved. 
While this method can be used without direct reference to engineering standards, it 
requires a broad documentation of the points studied to demonstrate the quality of 
the study. Experience has shown that this technique is most effective when carried 
out by a team of designers, operators, and other specialists as appropriate, at a 
series of study meetings [6]. 
 
2.3 Review of Risk Management Systems 
 
Intensive search of risk management system in safety domain give almost 
no concrete result. While risk management in other domain such as financial, give 
many well established systems such as credits risk management system. Risk 
management and safety management are used in various ways and are often seen 
as identical. The IEC-standard [15] defines Risk management as the systematic 
application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of 
analyzing, evaluating and controlling risk.  
 In several types of industry, the word “safety” is preferably often used. 
Safety management may be defined as the aspect of the overall management 
function that determines and implements the safety policy. This will involve a 
whole range of activities, initiatives, programs, etc., focused on technical, human 
and organizational aspects and referring to all the individual activities within the 
organization, which tend to be formalized as Safety Management Systems (SMS).  
In both these definitions, there are points of departure with regards to the 
policy of the company. That is in line with both quality and environmental 
standards. An example [16] is the environmental management system which is a 
part of the overall management system that includes organizational structure, 
planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources 
for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing and maintaining the 
environmental policy.    
 These three definitions are based on the existence of policy, consequently 
there is no safety management if a policy is lacking. All the three are also normative, 
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